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Abstract
The federal government created the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS) program in 2007 to keep terrorists from weaponizing hazardous chemicals. The
CFATS program did this by targeting high-risk chemical facilities and adding additional
regulations, but this has added an additional burden on the Local Emergency Planning
Committee (LEPC) that could negatively impact their capacity to prepare and collaborate
to prevent chemical disasters. The present study was conducted to evaluate the CFATS
program from the perspective of LEPCs to fill an existing gap in the literature. The study
was conducted using the theoretical frameworks of contingency theory of organizations
by Donaldson, and organizational culture theory by Shafritz et al., and employed
Bamberger and Mabry’s qualitative evaluative approach methodology for its analysis.
The research questions asked what programmatic and organizational changes could be
made to the CFATS program to better protect regulated chemicals and high-risk chemical
facilities. The research sample consisted of 11 LEPCs that identified what changes could
improve the CFATS program in the State of Washington and what organizational
changes would also improve the program. Findings included greater LEPC participation,
more chemical security inspectors, grant funding, and incident management support. This
study evaluated the data in the context of time, budget, data, and political constraints to
provide prioritized options the CFATS program could incorporate to further protect highrisk chemical facilities and increase community preparedness for chemical disasters
leading to positive social change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
In the 20 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a lot has
changed on the political, cultural, and even global stage. How these changes translate to
continued security and safety adjustments in a local community continues to evolve. Two
decades ago, not a single branch of government had the primary mission of domestic
security to defend the nation against a terrorist attack (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Many
things changed with the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
shortly after the 9/11 attacks and with subsequent domestic security policies such as the
issuance of Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8 released from the White House that
ordered DHS to develop a national preparedness system in coordination with other
federal agencies and in consultation with local governments (The White House, 2011).
Moving the clock forward to today, it is necessary to continue to adapt to threats, and
arguably one of the most significant threats in most American communities is the threat
of a chemical disaster, whether its cause could be human error, mechanical, or manmade.
On the intentional side, more than half of all terrorist attacks globally over a 55-year
period used some sort of chemical to facilitate the attack because chemicals are more
readily available and make a big impact (Zhu et al., 2020).
The potential for chemical attacks is very real, and the results can be devastating.
A few notable chemical disasters include the 2018 Syrian chlorine attack that killed
dozens and injured hundreds, a 2019 chemical plant explosion in Texas at a plant that
caused thousands to evacuate, and a 2020 poisonous gas release in Louisiana that put an
entire community on shelter-in-place orders (Anderson, 2021). Rural communities are not
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immune to these large chemical company disasters, as shown in the April 17, 2013,
explosion at a fertilizer company in a small town of West, Texas. In that rural community
with only a few thousand residents, 15 people died, and nearly 300 were injured when
tons of ammonium nitrate used as fertilizer detonated during a fire at the facility
(Cutchen, 2020). These are just a few chemical-related disasters that seem to grow more
prevalent, leading to the question of how communities can prepare and what the DHS can
do to help that effort.
In response to this concern, a program was created under what is now the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), referred to as “the nation’s
first regulatory program focused specifically on security at high-risk chemical facilities”
(CISA, 2020, p. 1). The program was enacted in 2007, as detailed by Shea (2016), to
address the threat of terrorists using certain industrial chemicals to harm Americans
called the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. This federal
regulation was enacted to identify high-risk chemical facilities and require them to
mitigate their vulnerabilities. However, adding another regulatory program to an already
heavily regulated industry comes with challenges, such as how it fits in with the many
other overlapping regulatory programs (Anderson, 2021). Understanding how the CFATS
program contributes to reducing the threat, risk, or vulnerability in local communities is
key to its success.
This chapter provides an overview of the issue with a background of why
studying the CFATS program from a community level is important and why studying the
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) was chosen as the target population to
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conduct this study. This section provides amplifying information on chemical security
and addresses the problem statement in more detail, the purpose of conducting the study,
and the research questions. To frame the study, this section also provides details on the
theoretical framework and nature of the study as well as some key definitions. Lastly, I
discuss assumptions related to the study, the study’s limitations, its significance, and a
summary of the content found in the chapter.
Background
In April 2013, a small rural community in West, Texas, experienced a devastating
fire and catastrophic detonation of ammonium nitrate used as fertilizer that leveled the
surrounding area. The explosion killed a dozen emergency responders and injured
hundreds of others in the vicinity (Cutchen, 2020; Tinney et al., 2016). This incident set
off a number of efforts at the federal level to keep something similar from happening
again, including new regulations, advisories, and working groups proposed by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF), and arguably the most important policy, a Presidential Executive Order in August
of the same year titled “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security EO 13650”
(Cutchen, 2020, p. 2). The EO 13650 mandated improvements to coordination between
federal agencies, first responders, and state, local, and tribal organizations, specifically
mentioning local and tribal emergency planning committees and sharing of information
to help them “prevent, prepare for, and respond to chemical incidents” (The White
House, 2013, p. 2). This order from the White House tasked the EPA, Department of
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Labor, and DHS to work together to coordinate information sharing and find ways to
prevent something similar from happening again.
Per a report of the West, Texas fertilizer explosion produced by the Chemical
Safety Board, the investigators found that at the time of the explosion, there were no
regulations in place that would have effectively prevented the incident, although there
were several of them that had pieces, components, or closely related regulations
(Cutchen, 2020). It is also important to note that the same report stated that the ATF did
not rule this incident as an intentional arson event until May 11, 2016, 3 years later. This
pivotal case demonstrated the complex regulatory system that shares space with EPA,
OSHA, ATF, Department of Transportation (DOT), and other agencies, all for a single
fertilizer company, in this example, in a very small rural community. While the LEPC
likely knew about the type and quantity of ammonium nitrate at this facility, the question
remains if the LEPC could have been better prepared to prevent something like this. This
is the significance of this research, revealing that another study on one of the many
agencies and their complex regulatory programs with its many exclusions and exceptions
is not the gap but studying what the LEPC could have done or could do today with the
help of all these federal programs needs to be addressed. This gap in knowledge is the
foundation of the research problem I addressed in this study for LEPCs in the State of
Washington.
It is unclear what the local community body of excellence should be consulted to
better understand this issue. There are limited studies on how LEPCs are the body of
government established by federal law to identify dangerous chemicals in a community
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(Whitney & Lindell, 2000), so to broaden this understanding, the LEPCs were chosen to
be the sample group of the study. This decision was supported by literature from the
federal CFATS program that assigns the LEPC coordination role to the regulated
chemical facility under what it defines as “metric 9.4 outreach” (CISA, 2009, p. 143). As
such, there is a solid link between the LEPC and the CFATS program even though it
appears to be secondary or through the regulated industry partner and not necessarily
direct. This is another area in which I aim to contribute to further understanding to fill in
this gap.
The literature on the CFATS program is sporadic at best, so I looked at the
materials holistically, going back over 10 years to frame the existing knowledge
adequately. For the CFATS program itself, this was deemed adequate as the CFATS
program itself has changed very little since its first implementation in 2007. Diaz (2007)
argued for regulating the chemical industry back when the program was first being
debated in Congress. Moreover, Kornegay (2008) explained how the CFATS required
certain companies to meet DHS requirements, including completing a security
vulnerability assessment and a site security plan and submitting to periodic visits by
inspectors from the DHS. Regarding the performance of the CFATS program, Currie
authored a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2018) and
highlighted concerns about how it is disjointed among various other components also
under federal purview. Coburn (2014) authored a report for the U.S. Senate Homeland
Security and Government Affairs Committee titled “Chemical Insecurity” that described
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many purported failures and shortcomings in the CFATS program, stating that its risk
calculations were “riddled with problems (p. 11).
There were articles that addressed how the CFATS program overlapped into other
programs, not just under DHS but other agencies and departments as well. For example,
Anderson (2021) discussed in detail how the CFATS program overlaps into missions
already being done by other agencies such as the ATF, Transportation Security
Administration, DOT, U.S. Coast Guard, and the EPA. Another researcher cited conflicts
with the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration where
inspectors from DHS prevented the facility from giving required materials to inspectors
from DOT, putting the facility in an awkward position (Coburn, 2014).
Johnson and Brown (2013) looked at chemical security from a mitigation
perspective using past disasters to show how spatial modeling is a crucial component to
reduce risk through distancing and isolation. Along these same lines, another GAO report
noted how CFATS requires facilities to develop emergency response plans to security
incidents with engagement from emergency responders and law enforcement and
compares that to how the more recent America’s Water Infrastructure Act mandates
coordination for the development of its risk assessments with local emergency response
planning committees (Anderson, 2020). Moreover, Qin et al. (2020) brought in the topic
of incident management discussion to chemical security as they discussed the impacts of
chemical facilities in Texas following Hurricane Harvey that occurred in 2017 but only
noted the Coast Guard and a Texas environmental agency, no mention of LEPCs or the
CFATS program. Kaelin (2014) brought in another area that overlaps chemical security
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with the worker safety programs under OSHA’s authority with process safety standards.
Kaelin used a specific case study of a 2013 fertilizer plant explosion in Texas to discuss
changes to the handling and storage of hazardous materials, but there was no mention of
LEPCs or the CFATS program.
The current research addresses the CFATS program as far as its understanding,
how it is implemented, and areas where it could be more transparent, but I do not address
the gap in emergency planning, preparedness, and how it integrates at the LEPC level
specific to the CFATS program. The questions remained if the program should have a
greater incident management or emergency response role and if it adequately integrates
into the local community to help them prepare or be given expanded roles and authority
to augment the efforts of LEPCs. This study was needed to address these questions to fill
in the gap in the literature on the topic. This data ultimately contributes to the body of
knowledge of CFATS and LEPCs in the State of Washington.
Problem Statement
The problem this study addressed is the gap that existed between the role of the
LEPC and the CFATS program in the effort to make communities safer. The purpose of
the CFATS program to “reduce the risk that certain hazardous chemicals are weaponized
by terrorists” (CISA, 2020, p. 1), and the purpose of the LEPCs in Washington is to
improve “state and local hazardous materials emergency response capabilities”
(Commission, 2017, p. 3). The study of the relationship between these two programs
addressed this existing gap in literature.
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Current literature and published national policies seemed to align in their overall
goal of keeping citizens safe from disasters such as the 2013 West, Texas ammonium
nitrate fire and explosion that killed a dozen emergency responders plus several citizens
and injured hundreds in the small rural community (Cutchen, 2020). At the local level,
the LEPC informs communities and even state counterparts what dangerous chemicals
are stored or transported within their areas in their communities, and at the federal level,
a national policy states that the federal government’s “most sacred responsibility is to
keep the American people safe from those who would do us harm,” citing examples
including terrorist use of chemicals to make weapons of mass destruction (White House,
2018). The federal government itself recognized that this issue is current and needs to be
studied, calling the current domestic chemical defense program “fragmented and not well
coordinated” (GAO, 2018, p. 14).
A possible cause of this problem is the disjointed way in which the national
chemical security program is implemented, with so many agencies having overlapping
roles. In the federal government alone, there are at least seven federal agencies having
regulatory oversight over some portion of chemical security antiterrorism regulations
(Anderson, 2021; Coburn, 2014). Within just the DHS, there are six different components
of this one agency that have distinct chemical antiterrorism roles in preventing and
detecting chemical-based terrorist attacks (GAO, 2018). This complexity of ownership
can present confusion, conflict, and many inefficiencies.
I posited that a study that looked at the CFATS program from the LEPCs in
Washington using an evaluative approach, as described by Bamberger and Mabry (2020),
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would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of these complexities, overlaps,
and inefficiencies. The CFATS program is becoming an increasingly significant issue in
academia and in public policy, making it more important to study (Chekouras, 2007;
Coburn, 2014; Diaz, 2007; "Environment and the Economy Subcommittee discusses
critical chemical security program: witnesses voice support for long-term extension of
CFATS program and urge passage of bipartisan reauthorization bill," 2011; "The Future
of CFATS," 2009; GAO, 2018; Goodman, 2011, 2014; "ILTA voices concerns with
CFATS," 2020; Jo, 2010, 2014, 2019, 2020; "United States: Environment and Climate
Change Subcommittee announces markup of CFATS and HFCS legislation," 2020;
Zhang & Reniers, 2018).
With the U.S. Congress extending the CFATS program in 2020 (States News
Service, 2020) for an additional 3 years, this research is timely and appropriate. In order
to address these gaps and needed changes, it was necessary to understand the LEPCs
perspective in the discussion of how the CFATS program worked or did not work in the
midst of the many other regulatory programs at the federal, state, and local government
levels. This knowledge contributed to understanding where the program conflicts with
other rules and identified opportunities to synergize with other chemical security
regulations and initiatives. To accomplish this, I used an evaluative approach, the “seven
steps of real world evaluation” by Bamberger and Mabry (2020, p. 7), to contribute to the
body of knowledge in the context budget, time, data, and political constraints that have
significant impact as to what LEPCs can do and what the CFATS program can provide.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between the CFATS
program and the LEPCs across the State of Washington to fill in the gap on how the
CFATS program may or may not be effectively contributing to community preparedness
for a chemical attack. There was a clear gap in the academic literature on this topic as
previous analyses (Anderson, 2021; Caldwell, 2014; GAO, 2016, 2018) evaluated the
CFATS program at the federal level regarding challenges with its implementation, how it
was performing to meet certain national metrics, and how it overlapped into many other
preexisting federal programs. In this study, I looked at the CFATS program from the
perspective of the LEPCs because these groups dealt with many of the other chemical
regulatory agencies and programs and had the potential to contribute significantly to the
understanding of the program. To fill the gap or contribute to its understanding, I
employed Bamberger and Mabry’s (2020) evaluative approach for methodology using the
contingency theory of organization (Donaldson, 2001) and the theory of organizational
culture (Shafritz et al., 2005) to frame the discussion. This increased understanding
helped fill the gap in the literature.
Research Questions
Research Question (RQ)1-Qualitative: What changes to the CFATS program
should be made to promote greater mission effectiveness to protect regulated chemicals
in the State of Washington?
RQ2-Qualitative: How could organizational changes improve how the CFATS
program protects high-risk chemical facilities in the State of Washington?
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical frameworks employed in this research followed Donaldson’s
(2001) contingency theory of organization and the theory of organizational culture
(Shafritz et al., 2005). The contingency theory was used as the lens to evaluate both the
LEPCs and the CFATS program. These programs were evaluated in the context of their
steady-state normal day-to-day operations and separately in the context of a disaster with
more chaos added into the system. In the latter environment, organizational structure is
less important, centralized power fades, and personal traits of initiative and leadership
take the forefront in a less organized and controlled environment. Contributing to this
theory was the organizational culture theory that helped reveal why some groups likely
work more harmoniously together, and others do not. If one’s identity is shaped and
formed along with the identity of the organization or the other way around, that could
contribute or hinder the natural bonds of inspectors from the EPA, DHS, ATF, and DOT,
for example. This theoretical framework helped clarify and explain how LEPCs transition
from crisis to monotonous routine and back again episodically, and this helped explain
why such an organization has different needs than many other businesses or other
government offices.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was an evaluative approach for methodology, as detailed
extensively by Bamberger and Mabry (2020), centered on the CISA within the DHS.
Within the CISA agency structure, I focused on the Office of Chemical Security that
manages the CFATS program, specifically in the State of Washington. Bamberger and
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Mabry indicated there were seven key steps for evaluation that included context, purpose,
budget, time, and data constraints, and these key factors provided the structure for the
data sought.
Definitions
To guide the understanding and allow for proper context of the lexicon used in
this study, the definitions used throughout the text were consolidated and are defined here
for reference to allow the reader to quickly understand how these terms were used in this
specific public policy analysis.
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS): This refers to the federal
regulatory antiterrorism program for high-risk chemical facilities as defined by the
CFATS Act of 2014 (CISA, 2020).
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): This is the agency that
manages the CFATS regulatory program addressing security at certain chemical facilities
(CISA, 2020).
Department of Homeland Security (DHS): For this context, the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency is part of DHS (CISA, 2020).
Facilities: This term is used extensively in this research and is taken directly from
the CFATS federal regulation itself and broadly refers to any entity that the CFATS
program has, or presumptively has, oversight of due to that entity’s possession of certain
chemicals over a specific amount, (e.g., pounds) or concentration, as identified in the
regulation (CFATS, 2020). This is a significant interpretation as under this broad
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definition, a “facility” could refer to a large chemical plant or a very small country store
in a rural community.
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC): The LEPC in this context refers
to the 43 LEPCs in Washington that collaborate “with their respective local emergency
management offices, conduct hazard identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk
assessment activities for their jurisdictions,” according to Washington’s Emergency
Management Division (Emergency Management Division, 2021).
Preparedness: In the context of a public policy discussion, the formal
interpretation is used for preparedness, referring to the whole of a government approach
for “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic
preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation,
including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters”
(The White House, 2011).
Top screen: This is part of the CFATS determination process where, “facilities
possessing a chemical of interest in quantities above the screen threshold quantity submit
a Top-Screen” as part of the determination process to see if the chemical facility will be
regulated under the CFATS program (Shea, 2016, p. 158).
Assumptions
This study was based on three key assumptions regarding engagement with the
LEPCs in Washington. First, I assumed that the vast majority of functional LEPCs in
Washington still address chemical safety and security as their primary mission and have
among its membership representation from groups such as emergency management, a
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local fire department, one or more of the chemical industries in the community that must
report its chemical holdings to the LEPC, and other members with unique contributory
roles (e.g., police, concerned citizens) either formally via charter or informally. The term
functional relates to the second assumption in that I assumed that not all 43 listed LEPCs
in Washington were actually meeting or had a functioning committee, whether that be
due to lack of interest, competing interests with other issues (e.g., public health),
duplication of effort in other groups, or any number of reasons. The third assumption was
that not every LEPC has regulated CFATS chemical facilities in their community but that
these LEPCs still prioritize the safety and security of the chemicals in their communities.
Scope and Delimitations
The population invited to participate in this study was drawn from the State of
Washington and only sources from LEPCs or directly related to a LEPC at the chairman’s
discretion. While there are lobby groups and national organizations that have spoken on
the CFATS program in the past, this study had limited its scope to the 43 names publicly
available for those in charge of LEPCs in Washington. This target group was done to
specifically contribute to the gap in the literature related to LEPC input on how the
CFATS program is or is not functioning specifically in the State of Washington. The
listed contacts were encouraged to share the invitation within their membership and that
could include national-level participants, state or federal contacts, or other contributors,
but these would likely be the same resources the LEPC would call upon for other
challenges or questions in their volunteer roles. As such, such extensions of the invitation
to participate in the study were considered acceptable.
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Limitations
A potential limitation to the study was expected to be obtaining adequate and
geographically diverse participation in the anonymous online survey. LEPCs are made up
of volunteers, and many members have other full-time jobs and many competing
obligations and likely get frequent solicitations. Another limitation might have been
equitable representation from the smaller and more rural LEPCs that did not have as
robust membership that a similar group in a large city might have, such as in Seattle or
Tacoma areas. The challenge to promoting feedback and participation in data collection
is the sensitivity of the subject matter because it is primarily an antiterrorism program,
and this might lead some to be reluctant to provide responses.
Significance
The significance of this research is twofold: A more in-depth analysis was needed
to evaluate the efficacy of the CFATS program to support Congressional policy review
before its expiration in 2023, and secondly, it is a responsibility of the government to
protect its citizens, so researching the effectiveness of its chemical security antiterrorism
policies was pertinent to that obligation. From that charge, I aimed to fill a gap in the
literature that has not taken into account the expertise of the LEPCs. Most, if not all,
communities in the United States have dangerous chemicals that terrorists could use as
weapons, whether fertilizer as a precursor to make a bomb or chlorine that could result in
a toxic gas cloud over neighborhoods. LEPCs address chemical hazards in communities,
as required by law (Whitney & Lindell, 2000), but there appeared to be a lack of
engagement about what these groups would recommend and bring to the discussion as
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concerns related to a chemical security program such as CFATS. While many federal
laws dealing with industrial chemicals are long-term or permanent, the CFATS program
will most likely be renewed, extended, or permanently authorized in 2023 when its
current temporary authorization runs out. As a result, I hope to contribute to and reduce
this gap in knowledge, which could result in safer communities.
Summary
This chapter provided the foundation for the study of the CFATS program by
identifying the gap in knowledge from the LEPCs on chemical security and addressed the
purpose of the study. To narrow the scope of the study, I presented the research questions
and the theoretical framework of contingency and organizational culture theories using an
evaluative approach. A few definitions were added to communicate their use in this
specific study, and assumptions and limitations were provided. The next chapter
continues with a comprehensive overview of existing literature and key government
reports on the CFATS program. The detailed review of literature establishes current
content and identifies the gap in literature where this study makes its contribution to
further the understanding of the CFATS program from the view of LEPCs in the State of
Washington.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This section addresses the depth and breadth of current literature related to this
study. The study addresses a chemical security regulatory program of the DHS titled the
CFATS program. The literature sought for this study included an emphasis on the most
recent information related to CFATS, recommended changes to the program, articles that
discussed it from various lenses to include incident management and preparedness,
overlap into other regulatory programs, and articles that provided critical analysis and
change recommendations. The primary purpose of this literature review was to find the
gap in research involving both LEPCs and the CFATS program to center the study and
ensure the research appropriately contributes knowledge to that gap.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature search for this study began with the theoretical foundation. To find
the appropriate theoretical theorists or theories, the Walden University Library was used
to research theorists appropriate for this study. The library recommended the use of the
Thoreau Multi-Database Search to locate articles on the applicable theoretical
framework. Primary sources were obtained through this manner, and then once key
theories and authors were identified, other sources were used to expand upon the search
that are listed below.
The search for articles supporting this study started in a similar manner with a
very broad search using the Walden University Library’s Thoreau database to locate
articles and then expanded to other sources by topic, journal, and authors using the
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variety of resources offered by Walden University’s Library that include the sources
listed below. Academic articles that establish the basis of this study were identified with
the following keywords: chemical security, chemical insecurity, CFATS, Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, chemical facility security, industrial chemical
security, and chemical antiterrorism. Sources for the articles originated from the Thoreau
multi-database, Homeland Security Digital Library, Military and Government Collection,
Public Administration Abstracts, Sage Journals, and Google Scholar.
Due to the limited number of recent articles, additional sources were also used to
include government databases and Congressional testimony. The specific resources
searched originated from the Walden University library using subject research for Public
Policy and Administration, Thoreau search, Academic Search Complete, ERIC, Gale
Academic OneFile Select, Gale OneFile: LegalTrac, govinfo, Military and Government
Collection, the National Science Foundation, SAGE Journals, SAGE Research Methods
Online, and SocINDEX with full text. Other databases outside of Walden University’s
library included Google Scholar, reports directly from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, and government documents that included federal regulations,
testimony from sessions of the U.S. Congress, and Executive Orders from the White
House.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation for this study was Donaldson’s (2001) contingency
theory of organizations. The contingency theory of organizations was selected because I
evaluated the effectiveness of a public sector organization, a component of the DHS, that
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manages the CFATS program, as described by Shea (2016). I also looked at LEPCs in
how they engage or used the CFATS program, and both studies were evaluated both from
a steady-state or normal operations tempo and from a theoretical crisis mode where they
are in a contingency mode as the needs for interaction and resources would arguably be
very different in those two stages. Contrasting these two operating environments helped
further enrich the understanding of that shared space between the two programs using the
contrasting conditions. The supplemental theoretical framework chosen for this analysis
was organizational culture theory (see Shafritz et al., 2005) that furthered the
understanding of both programs as it viewed the issue through the lens of the individual’s
innate cultural characteristics that might have contributed or competed against its own
success.
The primary foundation of the contingency theory of organizations, as described
by Donaldson (2001), along with other theorists in this field, provided the context of
analysis that was used in this study. Sayilar (2016) provided an in-depth background on
the structural contingency theory with its history, present-day interpretations, and where
it might evolve in the future as a field of study. Negandhi and Reimann (1972) posited
that how an organization performed was based primarily on its external environment. The
external environment was further explored by Greenwood et al. (1975), who theorized
that “organizational characteristics have to be shaped to meet situational circumstances,”
and this study was complemented by Ketokivi (2006), who emphasized flexibility
strategies Hinings et al. (1975) went further to propose new variables of differentiation
and integration that referred to the specialization of positions and the level of
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collaboration with other authorities to potentially synergize efforts in a resourceconstrained environment.
Other theorists have looked at the actual structure and organizational context of a
business to assess its strengths. Pitts (1980) presented the contingency theory of
multibusiness organization, where benefits and shortfalls of business expansion are
balanced between common business practices shared across more autonomous divisions
within an organization that would help it perform (p. 204). Burt et al. (1994) discussed a
contingency theory of structure and performance, and this dove more deeply into the
inner structural workings to unwrap the characteristics of centralized and decentralized
efforts, internal and external efforts, formalization of process, and increased
specialization of positions (pp. 15-17). Tomaskovic-Devey and Risman (1993) expanded
on the contingency theory and focused their efforts on labor process changes to study the
impacts of telecommuting. Senge (2013) further advanced the contingency theory of
organizations with what he called new institutionalism that brought society and culture
back into the discussion.
The second part of the theoretical foundation shifts the focus slightly from the
structure of the organization performing the task to the actual people within that
organization and how that impacts efficacy. The organizational culture theory, according
to Shafritz et al. (2005), is the “intangible phenomena, such as values, beliefs,
assumptions, perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior” (p. 352),
and I posited that this would play a significant factor in this study. Other theorists
expanded on this theory, including Landis et al. (2014), with their focus on leadership
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style, and Levitt et al. (1999), who studied project teams and their limiting factors. Burt et
al. (1994) dove into organizational culture impacts on business performance. Shepard and
James G. Hougland (1978) brought the focus back onto the individual with their
emphasis on what they called the complex man approach that tried to account for one’s
“need for autonomy or self-actualization” (p. 414). Chaudhry (2020) wrapped up this
section by focusing on enablers of change such as “inter-group collaboration, change
communications, rewards and training program,” among other key factors (p. 54). These
theories set the stage for how the following information found in current literature related
to the CFATS program that I evaluated in this study.
Chemical Security Antiterrorism Literature
The literature for this review fell into two broad categories: One being articles
that addressed various needs for change to the CFATS regulatory program, and the
second including articles that explained what the program was and how it worked. As this
literature review served a purpose to provide relevant and current information to identify
the research gap, a preference to include articles within the last 5 years for those that
addressed specific regulatory changes was emphasized, unless older materials provided
some clarity and needed background. Articles, reports, and Congressional testimony that
otherwise supported the program, such as how it worked for context, were included with
a 10-year cutoff, with few exceptions. After compiling the large number of articles, the
topics were further grouped into subcategories summarized below.
In order to categorize the articles for further analysis, several broad categories
were identified that helped place the materials into specific themes. The categories
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included background articles that explained the program itself, those that related to
mitigation (e.g., reduction of threat, consequence, or vulnerability), those that emphasized
collaboration (e.g., stronger coordination with other agencies, the regulated community,
and with related laws, regulations, and policies), and specific change recommendations to
the CFATS program. As the CFATS program is a regulatory program, this last section
also includes relevant Congressional testimony and government reports that spoke
directly about specific changes to the regulation itself.
CFATS Regulatory Program Background
The CFATS regulatory program (CFATS, 2020) implemented by the DHS was
created to restrict terrorists’ access to dangerous industrial chemicals so they could not be
used as weapons. With that in mind, the first notable review was of the “National
Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction” (White House, 2018) that states
that the first strategic objective is to ensure “the agents, precursors, and materials needed
to acquire WMD are placed beyond the reach of terrorists and other malicious non-state
actors,” and this was relevant for the conversation on CFATS as a chemical security
antiterrorism program (p. i). Increasing the specificity on what specific chemicals had a
history of use by terrorists, the National Academies of Sciences (2018) published a 200
plus page report on explosives, explosive precursors, and their use by terrorists
domestically and internationally that contributed to the understanding of the chemicals
the CFATS program regulates. In this context, the following articles emphasized
mitigation theories directed at the CFATS program itself or the mission of mitigating the
threat, consequence, or vulnerability of terrorists gaining access to specific chemicals to
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inflict harm. Articles on the topic gave a more detailed background on the CFATS
program and outlined some of its past struggles.
Several articles provided overviews of the CFATS program regarding types of
companies it impacted, how they were regulated, what requirements they had to work
with, and analyses of the process overall (GAO, 2016; Sadiq & McCreight, 2013; Shea,
2016). Shea stated that “the CFATS program has historically not met DHS-established
deadlines” citing data claiming that “approximately 25% of facilities under CFATS
remain in a state of preliminary risk-tier assignment” (p. 168), or “68% of the 3,900
regulated facilities still lack an approved safety plan,” as stated in a related article ("US
facilities slow to develop anti-terrorist plans," 2015, p. 13). The slow inspection rate
concern and inadequate inspector training were also points raised by Sadiq and
McCreight (2013, p. 400). A report from the GAO (2016) recommended a greater focus
on the chemical facilities that had to submit data to the CFATS program, roughly 37,000,
but that was not designated as high risk among the approximately 2,900 that did receive
the DHS designation as high risk. Per GAO (2016), in the group of 34,100 facilities
nationwide that submitted information to the CFATS program but did not get tiered under
its toxic release security issue, there were misreported distances from the chemical to
surrounding populations using its “distance of concern” (p. 174). As a result,
recommendations from the GAO included improving distance data provided by facilities,
creating a “documented process and procedures to track noncompliant facilities,” and
developing a better “performance measure that includes only planned measures that have
been implemented and verified” (pp. 192-193). The next grouping of literature obtained
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is grouped into the broad category of mitigating risks related to chemical security
programs.
Mitigation
Khakzad and Reniers (2015) presented a theory that posited two significant
changes that would mitigate the consequences of chemical facilities being attacked by
terrorists. These two items included “inherently safer technologies (ISTs)” and “land use
planning (LUP)” (p. 3). Per Khakzad and Reniers, the IST referred to five principles that
would benefit both the safety and security of a chemical facility that included minimizing
the number of the dangerous chemicals onsite to prevent access to terrorists, swapping
out dangerous chemicals and processes with less dangerous ones where able, modifying
processes to decrease volatility (e.g., lower pressures and temperatures), simplifying
“design and process” to minimize complexity and potential for errors, and implementing
building design and siting locations to purposefully mitigate effects of an attack (p. 3).
The other item that Khakzad and Reniers referred to was zoning law restrictions, or LUP,
where urban planning would zone industrial areas away from communities to minimize
the consequences just through physical distance. They cited previous attacks on chemical
plants to highlight the “vulnerability and attractiveness…as potential targets for terrorist
groups” primarily because, as they defined them, chemical plants were “large inventories
of hazardous materials including flammable, explosive, and toxic substances whose
accidental or intentional (undesired) release could result in major fires, explosions, or
dispersion of toxic gases” (p. 1).
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Another key item taken from Khakzad and Reniers (2015) was the key distinction
between safety and security, where Khakzad and Reniers agreed that while there was a
significant overlap between safety and security programs, there were also distinct
differences. To count them as inextricably linked actions such as their commonalities in
“consequence analysis” would miss the key distinctions related to security found in
“hazard analysis,” according to Khakzad and Reniers (2015), where the hazard is a
person with bad intent rather than a failed system, for example (p. 2). Khakzad and
Reniers concluded that even though there may be much easier targets for terrorists to
attack, chemical plants can help terrorists kill many people, and their greater impact
would likely be on the “economy and functionality of governments” (p. 2). While these
researchers focused on terrorist attacks on facilities, other articles addressed natural
disasters and industrial accidents.
Qin et al. (2020) discussed chemical facilities in Texas following Hurricane
Harvey that pummeled coastal Texas in 2017 and how the rain, winds, and resultant
flooding impacted chemical facilities. Qin et al. specifically cited a related fire and
explosion at the Arkema chemical facility but clarified that it was caused by “flooding
and rainfall” with over 40 inches, although there was no mention of CFATS or any
LEPCs (pp. 6-7). Jones et al. (2020) also mentioned the same Arkema facility in Texas
that ended in explosions resulting solely from significant flooding from a hurricane in
2017 but also did not speak of LEPCs or the CFATS program. Similarly, Jones et al.
identified chemical facilities using data from the U.S. EPA’s databases to look at how
many were in flood zones. There were more articles in this category but none that seemed
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to be relative to the CFATS program; however, a general overview helps establish the
boundaries of the literature.
An incident referenced in relation to the chemical security topic frequently
referred to a fertilizer explosion in West, Texas. The West, Texas fertilizer plant
explosion in 2013 killed 15 people, as detailed by Tinney et al. (2016) and Cutchen
(2020). This explosion, according to Tinney et al., involved “fertilizer-grade ammonium
nitrate (FGAN) – with an explosive energy equivalent to cause the damage of 12.5 tons
of TNT” (p. 1,493). Neither the Arkema disaster that resulted from the inundation of
floodwaters, or the West Texas fertilizer explosion was caused by terrorists, but both
showed the potential devastation possible from such dangerous industrial chemicals, and
as such, both serve as frequent references when discussing potential consequences of
failure of protecting chemicals. Cutchen (2020) posited that a major outcome of the April
17, 2013, West Fertilizer Company explosion was the Presidential Executive Order
issued on August 1, 2013, titled “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (EO
13650)” (p. 1) that federally mandated better collaboration between key federal agencies.
CFATS Collaboration
Some of the points that came out in the literature review were the multiple areas
where the CFATS program seemed to overlap into other federal regulatory programs. Per
one GAO report (Anderson, 2020), the CFATS program significantly overlaps with the
EPA’s Risk Management Program and the Coast Guard’s Maritime Transportation
Security Act. A more recent GAO report (Anderson, 2021, p. 63) described additional
overlaps with the CFATS program with the Transportation Security Agency’s “rail
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security requirements,” the ATF’s “explosive materials program,” the DOT’s “hazardous
waste program,” the EPA’s “Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) program,
the EPA’s “hazardous waste program,” and also the EPA’s “Water Infrastructure Act
program.”
Why is it important to collaborate? Melnikova (2016) stated, “factors that reduce
the duration of human life” include stresses from “external factors that are provoked by
the external environment” (pp. 64-65). In the author’s context, this referred to safety
concerns, but it is not a far stretch to see how security factors such as the threat of
terrorist using a company’s chemicals for harm or how major flooding, for example,
might result in safety system failures releasing chemicals into the environment resulting
in numerous public health hazards. Given such possibilities, it would seem apparent that
the CFATS program would benefit from greater synergies between the key missions of
worker safety, environmental protection, and security of the site and its people.
Is it possible to collaborate, given the size and complexity of the federal
government? A government report (GAO, 2018) shed some light on this question,
demonstrating the complexity of chemical security and how complex its components
contributed to the overall mission but from totally different programs and agencies. Per
the report, the DHS had a variety of chemical security-related roles, including “managing
domestic chemical incidents; developing and implementing chemical detection
technology; providing chemical preparedness guidance and support to state, local,
territorial, and tribal partners, and regulating and supporting the security of facilities that
use or store certain chemicals” (p. 2). The report went on to list components within DHS
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with key roles related to a potential “terrorist chemical attack” including “the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard” (p. 2).
Immediate questions that might come up are who owns what and who is in charge of any
specific chemical security threat or issue in a local community? Collaboration amongst
all these components within DHS requires a great deal of effort, but there are also many
agencies outside of DHS that also require coordinative efforts, per the report, that are
based on mission and regulatory commonalities specific to the heavily regulated chemical
industry.
External to DHS itself, there are seemingly countless other authorities and
agencies that operate in the regulated chemical industry and impact chemical security
regulations that should prompt collaboration. Likely the most notable collaboration effort
in this context was a federal workgroup established by the Office of Executive Order
13650 (Cutchen, 2020; The White House, 2013) and formalized a working group to
improve chemical facility security collaboration by DHS, EPA, and the Secretary of
Labor. The Executive Order ("Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security," 2013)
was mentioned in multiple articles, including some as its primary topic (Chilworth
Technology, 2014; Kaelin, 2014; "OSHA Leading EPA, Homeland Security on New
Chemical Safety Reform Initiative," 2014; "Report Summarizes Progress on Chemical
Facility Safety," 2014). One such article (Ramsdell, 2016) mentioned the U.S.
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) due to a recent regulatory update to its Toxic
Substances Control Act that, according to the article, had expanded its oversight onto a
“host of chemicals.” While the coordination of federal regulators arriving at the same
facility for issues related to the same chemical under different regulations (e.g., safety,
security, and safety regulations), there are also other areas of the CFATS program that
require additional and less traditional collaboration.
In addition to the many regulations and authorities over the physical chemicals,
the manufacturers of those chemicals, and shippers of the chemicals, the CFATS program
also has regulatory roles in cybersecurity to protect the chemicals. An article that
discussed critical infrastructure and domestic terrorism (O’Connell, 2020) brought in the
topics of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, citing numerous recent attacks. Lozowski (2014)
brought in mention of the “Cybersecurity Framework,” created by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework, established by a Presidential executive
order. Cosman (2014) discussed the many security challenges associated with industrial
control systems that present unique challenges and how many chemical companies use
the NIST Framework to keep hackers out.
Other threats requiring programmatic flexibility include what one author
(O’Connell, 2020) referred to as “emerging threats” (p. 5). These new threats, according
to O’Connell, included how to deal with drones and “unmanned aircraft systems UAS)”
that could “drop explosives and hazardous substances, …be equipped with weapons,
conduct unauthorized surveillance, aid hackers in overcoming physical barriers, and act
as kamikaze agents for nefarious actors” (p. 5). Looking at that statement just from a
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collaboration perspective brings in a need to coordinate with other agencies (e.g., Federal
Aviation Administration among others) and UAS groups to partake in discussions on how
best to deconflict from UAS threats to chemical facilities while allowing safe areas for
recreational and commercial UAS users to operate safely.
Lozowski (2014, p. 5) stated that global interest in “chemical process industries
(CPI)” security within the United States was increasing based on the domestic
methodology of integrating safety and security together and also the establishment of
partnerships to develop policies and best practices from groups consisting of both public
and private sector memberships. A common theme among the articles was the need for
collaboration among diverse public and private entities, while other articles focused more
specifically on change itself to the CFATS regulations.
Changes to the CFATS Policy
The CFATS program is certainly not new to the reauthorization or extension
process, but it arguably needs something it hasn’t found as of yet to make it permanent or
to obtain a long-term reauthorization. The program was implemented in 2007 as an
interim rule meaning its future was never certain, according to Sadiq and McCreight
(2013). The law was written in Congress to be that way in what Allmond (2012) referred
to as the “non-permanence of CFATS” that was created with a “sunset provision” to
expire after only three years. Per Allmond (2012), the program continued to be
reauthorized in yearly increments up until 2013, with what Lozowski (2014) referred to
as an “annual process that the program has undergone for the past seven years since its
inception” (p. 5). In 2014 it was fortunate to receive a four-year authorization with the
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passage of the “Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of
2014, according to the agency’s website (CISA, 2020). The program then received a 15month extension in 2019 (States News Service, 2019), up to its most recent
reauthorization in July 2020 that pushed it out to July 27, 2023, according to the (States
News Service, 2020). The preference for long-term reauthorization was emphasized in
congressional testimony, according to States News Service (2020), by national-level
industry groups including the National Association of Chemical Distributors, the
Columbus Chemical Industries, Inc, and the American Chemistry Council. The Fertilizer
Institute, during the same testimony, supported “a multiyear reauthorization” (p. 9). (U.S.
Senate 115th Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
2018). Another group recommended a much shorter reauthorization at only 18-months
(2016). The “American Chemistry Council” (PR Newswire, 2019) supported the CFATS
program and promoted a 15-month extension with suggested enhancements to better
leverage “industry programs” and “ensuring employee screening focuses on high-risk
facilities and protects personal data” (p. 5).
Regulation Changes
There were a number of options provided from various perspectives on how to
change the CFATS regulations. One author (Gottron, 2020) broke it down to three simple
options that including mandating DHS include “inherently safer technologies” to reduce
the overall exposure of their vulnerabilities, formalizing “DHS’s current practice of
disseminating lessons learned,” or the least restrictive option of just allowing the DHS to
modify the program on its own (p. 2). Shea (2010, p. 14) noted “some advocacy groups
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have called for the inclusion of currently exempt facilities, such as water and wastewater
treatment facilities” and suggested modifications to the existing exemptions for MTSA
and to the “facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to clarify the
scope of the exemption.” Some argued that adding in sewage and wastewater treatment
facilities might overwhelm the CFATS program stating the “CFATS was already facility
many challenges” (Sadiq, 2013, p. 171). Another perspective (Gottron, 2020) stated the
reason for “public water systems and wastewater treatment works” was because these
services were critical to public need and shouldn’t be subjected to a potential shutdown
for security shortfalls by DHS as the consequences of not providing “public sanitation,
potable water, and fire protection” would be too severe.
Transparency
The topic of transparency has been applied to the CFATS program in a number of
ways over the years, referring to very different issues of concern. A GAO report (DHS
efforts to assess chemical security risk and gather feedback on facility outreach can be
strengthened, 2013) recommended that the CFATS program “conduct an independent
peer review…that fully validates and verifies ISCD’s risk assessment approach consistent
with the recommendations of the National Research Council of the National Academies
(p. 36). The American Coatings Association (ACA) also spoke about the need for better
transparency in the CFATS program, but their focus was allowing the chemical facility to
have a clearer vision of just how the risk at their facility was determined under the
CFATS program (States News Service, 2019). Sadiq and McCreight (2013) argued the
need for better transparency for CFATS tiering determinations and security plan review
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that was also echoed by the Fertilizer Institute during congressional testimony (U.S.
Senate 115th Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
2018). Shea (2010) spoke about the need for transparency, but in this context, it was more
about sharing information with local communities for emergency planning. The Society
of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA) supported stronger engagement by
DHS, stating, “DHS should rely on its private sector partners to share expertise and best
practices as it improves its CFATS tools” (Allmond, 2012). These suggestions seemed to
align with a previous government report (GAO, 2018) that DHS should verify data
provided by facilities is accurate, improve its risk assessment approach, incorporate a
peer review of its “risk assessment approach” program, and to better “document
processes and procedures for managing compliance with security plans” (p. 29). Per the
same GAO report, these recommendations have already been implemented or are in the
process of being addressed.
Overall, there were nearly a dozen recommended changes that would potentially
benefit the CFATS program, as indicated below by numerous authors:
1. Long-term Reauthorization: The preference for long-term reauthorization was
emphasized in congressional testimony by the National Association of
Chemical Distributors, the Columbus Chemical Industries, Inc, and the
American Chemistry Council (U.S. Senate 115th Congress: Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2018).
2. Inspector training: Sadiq and McCreight (2013) posited that lack of training
among inspectors contributed to “reduced productivity, low employee morale,
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and high turnover” (pp. 399-400). A union leader and chemical security
inspector provided testimony and stated that inspectors needed “formal and
specialized training on physical security” and on cybersecurity to understand,
“analysis, understanding, or protecting cyber systems” and not just how to fill
out reports, as stated in the testimony of Jesse LeGros Jr. (U.S. Senate 115th
Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2018,
pp. 57-58). These comments were later echoed in a GAO report that while the
CFATS program had made efforts to improve cybersecurity training for
inspectors, it has yet to create “measures to assess how training will contribute
to program results” (GAO, 2020, p. 25).
3. Inherently Safer Technologies: “Inherently safer technologies,” per Shea
(2010, p. 10), referred to the “mandate or adoption or consideration of
changes in chemical process to reduce the potential consequences following a
successful attack on a chemical facility.” Not all supported IST, as noted by
Sadiq (2013) but Shea (2010) went further to add that any IST measures be
added to the CFATS regulated facility’s site security plan and other agencies,
i.e., “the appropriate regulatory entity” able to assess and review the IST
recommendation (e.g., EPA or OSHA) (p. 16).
4. Appendix A (list of CFATS regulated chemicals):
•

The International Liquid Terminals Association (ILTA) ("ILTA voices
concerns with CFATS," 2020) recommended that “gasoline, diesel, and
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other Class 1, 2, and 3 flammable mixtures are categorized appropriately
and not treated as ‘Chemicals of Interest’”.
•

Frequent review of Appendix A chemicals: A senior official with Dow
Chemical recommended a regular review of the “chemicals of interest list”
(U.S. Senate 115th Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 2018).

5. Land use planning (LUP): According to Khakzad and Reniers (2015), LUP
uses zoning areas so that high-risk types of activities (e.g., chemical facility)
would not be in the same areas as homes, hospitals, and schools.
6. Tiering process transparency: Sadiq and McCreight (2013) argued the need
for better transparency for CFATS tiering determinations and security plan
review that was also echoed by the Fertilizer Institute during congressional
testimony (U.S. Senate 115th Congress: Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, 2018).
7. Regulatory compliance: A report (GAO, 2018) stated the agency needs to
better “document processes and procedures for managing compliance with
security plans” (p. 29).
8. Information sharing with LEPCs and 1st Responders: Shea (2010) spoke about
the need for transparency with local communities for emergency planning, but
the extent of this was mostly related to preemption concerns so that local and
state laws didn’t conflict with the federal CFATS program.
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•

Partnering with industry: The Society of Chemical Manufacturers and
Affiliates (SOCMA) stated, “DHS should rely on its private sector
partners to share expertise and best practices as it improves its CFATS
tools” (Allmond, 2012).

•

Regulatory collaboration: A senior official with Dow Chemical
recommended improved coordination for CFATS with other federal
chemical security and safety regulatory programs” (U.S. Senate 115th
Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
2018).

9. Emerging threats (e.g., drones): These new threats, according to (O’Connell,
2020) included drones and “unmanned aircraft systems UAS)” that could
“drop explosives and hazardous substances, …be equipped with weapons,
conduct unauthorized surveillance, aid hackers in overcoming physical
barriers, and act as kamikaze agents for nefarious actors” (p. 5).
10. Synergy amongst regulatory agencies: Melnikova (2016) stated that any
changes to the CFATS reauthorization should continue to evaluate synergies
between these key roles of worker safety, environmental protection, and
security of the site and its people.
Summary and Conclusions
Literature, testimony, reports, and related materials collected for this review
provided an extensive overview of the CFATS regulatory program, its struggles that it
has overcome or continues to make improvements on and pointed towards improvements
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that would make it better if reauthorized in 2023 or made permanent. From the review,
recommendations for improvements were discovered, and some of the program’s past
struggles and challenges were presented. After conducting this thorough review, it was
clear there was a gap in that next level of depth to discuss the CFATS program, possibly
with additional roles in preparedness, mitigation, and possibly even response. This area
of study has not been adequately debated, and neither has the role of the LEPC on this
topic to get their perspective and input on how the CFATS program could more
effectively support their needs. It is theorized that such a study will strongly benefit
research on this topic by contributing to the existing body of knowledge. The
methodology for how this research was conducted is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between the DHS
CFATS program and the LEPCs across the State of Washington to fill in the gap in
literature reflecting the interaction and potential contributions that might further the body
of knowledge on the efficacy of the CFATS program from the view of the LEPCs. This
research is intended to contribute to a body of knowledge that could potentially lead to an
increase in community preparedness related to a chemical attack in the State of
Washington by more effectively understanding the LEPC-CFATS relationship and that
could additionally contribute to policy improvements during its next potential
reauthorization in 2023.
The gap on this topic became apparent after extensive research into existing
literature that showed previous analyses (Anderson, 2021; Caldwell, 2014; GAO, 2016,
2018) evaluating the CFATS program at the federal level regarding challenges with its
implementation, how it performed, and how it overlapped into other preexisting federal
programs. What previous analyses did not do was to ask LEPCs for their perspective on
how the program was working, how it supported their efforts at the local community
level, how it possibly made their jobs more complex, or how it could be modified to
make their jobs easier. I looked at the CFATS program from the perspective of the
LEPCs because these groups deal with many of the other chemical regulatory agencies
and have the potential to contribute significantly to the understanding of the program. To
fill the gap or contribute to its understanding, I used the research employed Bamberger
and Mabry’s (2020) evaluative approach for methodology using the contingency theory
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of organization (Donaldson, 2001) and the theory of organizational culture (Shafritz et
al., 2005) to frame the discussion. I used these data to fill the gap in literature specifically
for LEPCs in the State of Washington regarding their engagement and experience with
the CFATS program in the context of how it contributes to increased preparedness at the
community level.
In the following sections, I describe the methodology that was used in this
research and how the data were obtained. In the first section, I explain why the specific
methodology was chosen, and then I explain the role of the researcher as it pertains to
this research. The methodology is discussed for the study, and this includes the sampling
strategy, recruitment of participants, sample size goals based on similar research, and the
instrumentation; the section closes with a conclusion that summarizes the chapter.
Research Design and Rationale
The following questions were developed to conduct and guide this research into
the efficacy of the CFATS program specifically within the State of Washington:
RQ1-Qualitative: What changes to the CFATS program should be made to
promote greater mission effectiveness to protect regulated chemicals in the state of
Washington?
RQ2-Qualitative: How could organizational changes improve how the CFATS
program protects high-risk chemical facilities in the state of Washington?
To answer the questions regarding the efficacy of an existing federal policy that is
specific to Washington, I chose the theoretical frameworks of Donaldson’s (2001)
contingency theory of organization and the theory of organizational culture (Shafritz et
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al., 2005). This contingency theory was chosen to evaluate the program from a
perspective of something external having a direct impact on it, such as a successful
terrorist attack or use of industrial chemicals regulated by the program to look
introspectively at the regulation to see how it might be changed in that context to better
support such an event as opposed to looking at the program in a static state where it is
operating under the best of conditions. The secondary theory was used to take a look at
the static program to assess factors that might be positively or negatively contributing to
its functionality.
The organizational culture (Shafritz et al., 2005) of a program is important to look
at as it is likely to impact morale, training, competency, and other factors. For example, if
the organization is law enforcement focused and it spent a lot of its energy on that
particular identity, it might miss opportunities to align with other organizations that
identify more on the safety or protection of the environmental aspects. This was
important to evaluate as a potential contributing factor that might limit or strengthen
certain types of interagency and public-private collaboration that could help the program
be more effective in its implementation. As such, it was important to frame this study
using this theory as it fills an existing gap in literature and study on this topic.
Selection of Qualitative Method
To obtain the appropriate and most relevant research methodology, I referred to
Walden University’s research center to review, compare, and analyze the most relevant
design and methodology resources and relied heavily on guidance in key reference books
such as Research methods in public administration and nonprofit management (McNabb,
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2008), Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among the five approaches
(Creswell, 2007), and The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research methods (Given,
2008a), emphasizing the chapter on evaluation research. From this guidance and
established methods, the evaluative approach was chosen, as described by Bamberger and
Mabry (2020) in their book titled Real world evaluation: Working under budget, time,
data, and political constraints. This approach provided great depth and breadth on the
research design, allowing for flexibility to align with the research questions, purpose, and
gaps identified in the literature.
While the evaluative research design option was chosen as the most appropriate
research design, other options were considered but eliminated due to limitations or
strengths in other areas that this intended research would not support. Other approaches
considered included the five approaches identified by Creswell (2007) of narrative
research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. From that list,
the approaches of phenomenology, grounded theory, and case study were first reviewed
as potential frameworks while deciding what aspects of the policy would be researched
and what best aligned with the purpose, the research questions, and the existing gap in the
literature.
Role of the Researcher
The qualitative method for this research employed an evaluative approach, as
detailed extensively by Bamberger and Mabry (2020), and the role of the researcher
included both tacit and interactionist roles, as described by Given (2008b). The tacit
roles, according to Given, refer to the expertise and knowledge the researcher brings to
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the research that would make the researcher the “recognized expert” who would make
sure the study continues forward following established policies, standards, and
procedures. These roles, in this context, include possessing expertise in the federal
regulatory professional field dealing with chemicals, a current understanding of the
existing literature on domestic chemical security antiterrorism issues, understanding the
roles that are key to begin this evaluative approach, such as understanding the key
organizations at the federal, state, tribal, local, and private sectors, and how to engage
these entities involved in the sampling successfully.
In the second role of the interactionist, as defined by Given (2008b), the
researcher could potentially fulfill the roles of “complete member” and the “participant as
observer” if an LEPC asked for more personal interaction to explain the CFATS program
in greater depth and to answer questions about specific components of the policy or
program (pp. 4-8). My data source came from the 43 LEPC contacts across the State of
Washington. In that context, I acted as a participant and observer only to engage virtually
with a potential participant if a particular person had questions or wanted more context
prior to consenting to participate in the anonymous online survey. This only happened
twice when two contacts asked a clarifying question or responded to ask a related
question that was outside the bounds of this study. Such an interaction was likely due to
comfort levels, such as wanting to better understand the CFATS program in Washington
or to establish a certain level of trust with me prior to consenting or recommending others
participate in the anonymous online survey.
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I am a federal employee within the agency that implements the CFATS program
in the Pacific Northwest, including the State of Washington. However, I did not have an
authority role or position of authority over any of the candidates sampled but rather
served as an expert in the CFATS program who could help explain the current iteration of
the policy and answer questions that respondents had to better understand the limitations
and breadth of the policy. With this position, I did have several invited participants
engage with minimal questions or statements that included updates on staff changes, an
invite for me to chair a specific LEPC, and one member who requested the e-mail
invitation be resent because of significant computer issues they had that prevented them
from initially participating. I did not receive any questions back asking for clarification
on the policy or any subsequent engagement.
To minimize bias, sampling was set up to be obtained online only and
anonymously from each of the respondents with their own written responses to minimize
any introduced interpretation by myself, as discussed by Katzer et al. (1998). I chose to
focus on data collection from each of the 43 listed LEPCs contacts across the state of
Washington via their single representative published in public records to distance myself
from any perception of coercion or influence and to afford a high level of geographic
diversity in the participation. This selected population allowed for the broadest voluntary
participation in the research, and the research was presented as completely voluntary and
solely for the purposes of commenting on the existing regulation to identify data related
to its efficacy from the LEPC perspective. I made extra efforts to separate this research
from having any formal or implied connections to anything from the U.S. DHS by stating
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so in the consent form and only engaging the potential sample pool using the Walden email. No incentives were given for this research related to any data collection.
Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
I chose to focus on members of the LEPCs in Washington because they
potentially provide access to a very diverse cadre of experts who are over 18 years of age
and who deal with numerous aspects of chemical hazards (e.g., first responder, policy,
emergency management) in specific communities and represent every corner of the State.
According to the State of Washington’s Emergency Management Division (2021)
website, there are 43 LEPC contacts listed for Washington. These LEPCs represent every
part of the state and are comprised of both those in public and private sectors with
knowledge about dangerous chemicals in their specific areas; they also include tribal
representation and at least one large military base. Every LEPC contact was contacted by
e-mail and invited to participate in the study. Each invitation also invited the chairperson
of the committee to invite others within their own committee to participate in the
anonymous online survey. This was done to allow the chairperson to speak for the group
or to allow that person to defer to someone within their own committee who was much
more knowledgeable on the topic or just to expand perspective at their prerogative. This
was encouraged to help broaden the expertise of the respondents and the specialties they
represented to help with diverse views on the program.
The intended sample size was a minimum of 13 respondents from LEPCs within
the State of Washington. LEPCs, in general, often contain voluntary memberships that,
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according to the bylaws of one large LEPC in Pierce County, Washington, can include
“state and local officials, law enforcement agencies, emergency management agencies,
firefighting agencies, first aid agencies, local environmental organizations, hospitals,
transportation organizations, news media, community groups, owners and operators of
[chemical] facilities…and institutions of higher education” (Kilpatrick, 2020, p. 3). This
target number was selected after reviewing guidance on sample selection strategies and
limitations (see Creswell, 2007; Katzer et al., 1998; McNabb, 2008) and a similar
research design (see Moss, 1982), where the researcher divided the participants into three
categories of perspectives to allow for a deeper dive into the content offered from the
sample population. This study garnered 11 respondents almost equally representing rural
and urban LEPCs.
Sampling Strategy
Selection of the LEPCs were chosen as the source of the sampling as these groups
deal at the local community level issues related to dangerous industrial chemicals, and the
role of the LEPCs was highlighted as significant during the literature review (Shea, 2011;
U.S. Senate 115th Congress: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 2018). LEPCs serve the role of preparing communities to address dangers
associated with various chemicals in their community with varying degrees of success, as
noted by Whitney and Lindell (2000). Whitney and Lindell noted that LEPCs are
mandated by law and are staffed by volunteers from various groups, but they often get
very little to no funding to carry out their immense responsibilities. For these very
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reasons, the LEPC members in Washington were chosen as the source of the samples due
to their passion and vested interest within their own local communities.
Participant Selection Criteria
The LEPC chairman or primary contact listed on the contact LEPC contact sheet
(Washington Department of Ecology, 2021) was used for primary contact with each of
the 43 listed LEPCs, according to the state (Emergency Management Division, 2021).
From that point, the selection of each potential respondent relied on the primary point of
contact to respond and participate personally, to refer the request for participation to any
of its members, or to not respond. Referrals were limited to members of the individual
LEPC or those who had a direct and supporting role, such as any advisors or regulatory
personnel specifically identified by an LEPC. There was a duration cutoff for
participation (i.e., 2 weeks), but the research included all data submitted that represented
LEPCs across Washington.
How Participants Are Known to Meet the Criterion
Participants in the study were adults 18 years old or older who had experience in
the chemical industry from industry, regulatory, government, or first responder
perspectives. The LEPC resource was selected as the primary population resource as this
itself filters out the sample to only those who have an interest or vested interest in
chemical safety or security in that specific community. From that population, several
questions were used to categorize the participants into subcategories and years of
experience to help data coding later by associating types of recommendations or
comments to each subcategory (e.g., first responders, emergency managers, or elected
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officials, and whether their LEPC is in a rural or urban community). Because there was a
gap in the literature on the CFATS program from an LEPC perspective and no previous
studies on LEPCs specific to the State of Washington, I accepted all responses and then
categorized or coded appropriately such as one who responded they did not belong to a
LEPC in Washington as that was originally considered to be a disqualifying response and
it could not be known if it that option was selected in error or not. If a respondent
annotated or stated they had no experience but still provided a sound recommendation to
the future of the CFATS regulation, this was included and categorized accordingly in this
study; this referred to their level of expertise on the CFATS program. Because not all
LEPCs had CFATS regulated sites in them, this was not a disqualifier as it is understood
that just because the LEPC member was thoroughly versed on the CFATS program, they
still knew what was needed from such a program to help secure dangerous chemicals in
their community and could so share that response to help support this research.
Verification of the sources was not done as it was an anonymous online survey, and there
was nothing in the data provided that suggested any irregularities that would stand
significantly outside the boundaries of what was presented in Chapter 2.
Identification, Contacting, and Recruitment of Participants
The sample population came from the 43 LEPC contacts located in Washington,
and contact information was through formal channels published by the State of
Washington’s Emergency Management Division that provides the public listing of the
LEPC and contact information. The researcher contacted all 43 listed LEPC contact emails, provided an overview of the research being conducted, an overview of the topic,
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and the type of individual sought for inclusion in the study. It was expected that only a
portion would respond to the inquiry and participate in the online anonymous
questionnaire and approximately 25% did participate.
Relationship Between Saturation and Sample Size
The target sample size desired for this study was 13, and the researcher accepted
all respondents that replied within the window provided during the open period described
within the survey invitations (e.g., 14 days). The saturation number, if achieved, would
be the point that all 43 LEPCs provided a response, or only a fraction of that have
responded, but no new information is obtained in any or all of the subcategories
demonstrating an effective and representative sample of the intended population. This
recruitment method would ensure there is a minimal bias associated with the researcher
regarding who gets chosen to participate.
Instrumentation
The researcher used a researcher-produced survey to collect data for this research
as the intended primary tool of collection. An e-mail invitation was provided to all 43
LEPC contacts across Washington that included a link to the online survey. The e-mail
introduced the issue and had a link to the online consent form for ethical protection
concerns that aligned with Walden University’s Institution Review Board and requested
voluntary participation in the survey to assist in the research. To facilitate data collection
and coding, online software called SurveyMonkey was used as a data collection tool, but
final data coding was done manually.
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Summary
This section explained the methodology used in this qualitative study to
contribute to the body of knowledge related to LEPCs in Washington and the CFATS
program in their shared mission to prevent terrorists from accessing certain dangerous
chemicals to harm Americans. The section described the research design and rationale for
choosing this method, explained the role of the researcher, and went over the
methodology in detail. The sampling strategy was discussed and why that particular
group was chosen, and also how the participants were recruited. Lastly, the
instrumentation for the study was discussed, and then the section was summarized. The
data collected from these LEPCs in Washington, how it is coded to make it more
functional, and other related details will be discussed next in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative evaluative study was to assess the efficacy and
potential areas for change to the CFATS program from the perspective of LEPCs in
Washington to fill a gap in literature. The CFATS program has been evaluated by the
federal government itself (Anderson, 2020, 2021; GAO, 2020), there are multiple articles
on how it implements its program on the chemical industries throughout the nation
(CISA, 2020; Houlton, 2014; Khakzad & Reniers, 2015; Lozowski, 2014; "US facilities
slow to develop anti-terrorist plans," 2015), and there are some articles about how
national security-focused regulations have conflicted with existing environmental
protection regulations (Chekouras, 2007; Cutchen, 2020), but a gap existed with the
overlap between LEPCs and the CFATS program. To guide the research, there were two
research questions that addressed what changes could be made to the CFATS program to
make it more effective in Washington, and if there any organizational changes that could
contribute to that improvement.
In this section, I present the data obtained from the study. The setting of the
research is discussed to explain why the target group was used to obtain the results. The
demographics of the study are presented in this section to illustrate the various categories
the anonymous respondents self-identified. This section also details the data collected
along with the process used. Chapter 4 contains a section of the data analysis to present
the qualitative data coding used, provides evidence of trustworthiness, and concludes
with a section on the results and a summary.
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Setting
The data collection for this research took place in mid to late June of 2021 in
Washington, and this specific period presented some challenges, with several competing
events that LEPCs were simultaneously facing. First, the entire state was under an
excessive heat warning forecast for the upcoming week (The Weather Channel, 2021)
with triple digit temperatures on the way, and this likely was a focus for planning with
emergency managers, first responders, and chemical industry professionals. The second
competing priority that may have detracted from participation in this study was a
disruption to the supply of chlorine that threatened drinking water supplies and water
treatment facilities in the state (see Thompson, 2021). This chlorine shortage resulted in
at least one community in Washington declaring a water shortage emergency (Thompson,
2021). The third potential factor that could have detracted from study participation was
that LEPCs were ramping up to summer activities that coincided with the governor’s
reopening of the state on June 30th after being locked down more than a year due to
COVID-19 pandemic restrictions (see Inslee, 2021).
The process for data collection involved reaching out virtually to the LEPC
contacts in Washington using publicly available data. These contacts were initially
contacted regarding the study and invited to participate in the anonymous online study.
Given the competing priorities, a follow up reminder was sent a few days after the initial
invitation and a third and final batch of e-mails was sent near the end of the data
collection period that garnered an additional four participants. Overall, 11 participants
accepted the consent to participate and joined the study, representing an approximate
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25% response rate of initial list of invites. The data provided helps fill the void in
literature by hearing from a new perspective on the CFATS program from that of the
LEPCs.
Demographics
The study consisted of a total of 11 participants, and the demographics obtained
included several categories to help broadly categorize the participants while also
maintaining their anonymity. I invited LEPC members over the age of 18 by contacting
each committee in Washington using contact data provided on a state website and then
asking those contacts to share within their own membership. The respondents were then
provided with several questions that categorized them such as whether they indeed
belonged to a LEPC in Washington, whether they considered it to be in an urban or rural
community, and the expertise on the LEPC the participant self-identified (e.g., fire, law
enforcement, emergency management, public official). See Table 1 for the demographics.
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Table 1
Demographics
Respondent

Member WA

Urban(U)/Rural

Expertise (EM, Industry,

#

LEPC (Y/N)

(R)

other)

1

Y

R

EM

2

Y

R

EM

3

Y

U

EM

4

Y

U

EM

5

Y

R

Industry

6

Y

U

EM

7

N

U

Other

8

N

-

-

9

-

-

-

10

Y

U

Other

11

Y

R

EM

Note. EM = Emergency manager; “-” = no response.
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While there was a total of 11 respondents that logged into the anonymous survey
stemming from the e-mail invitation that was sent to all Washington LEPCs, there were a
couple peculiarities worth noting. Two participants stated they were not members of a
Washington LEPC but any information they provided was still coded as it was assumed
there might have been some confusion with the question. For example, LEPCs can have
very formal memberships with elected positions while others might be much less formal.
In either case, there are frequently many additional participants who engage with an
LEPC and would be considered part of the group for the purpose of this study but it is
probable that the respondents were stating they weren’t part of the elected LEPC board
membership. The other item worth noting was that Respondent #9 did not provide any
input to the study other than declaring consent to participate. This could be attributed to
someone with computer or network issues or someone who just wanted to see the
questions and then chose not to provide additional input. Rather than disqualifying these
Respondents from the study, they were left in for full transparency of who participated.
For Respondents # 7 and #8 who stated they weren’t part of an LEPC, they were included
because their input appeared very valid in comparison with the other entries and their
responses did not raise any other concerns that might have indicated potential unintended
access from someone outside the intended parameters of this study.
Data Collection
The authorization to commence data collection was provided by Walden
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) on June 14, 2021, with the authorization
number 06-14-21-0042902. Invites to participate in the study were sent out via e-mail in
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batches of three to five using contact information on the State of Washington’s website
for LEPC contacts (Emergency Management Division, 2021) on June 15, 2021. The
invitations were sent to all 43 listed LEPC contacts plus the LEPC program coordinator
who was also listed in this location, for a total of 44 invitations. The contact names came
from a downloaded version of the list of contacts that was saved in May, and after
comparison with the website version that was more recently updated, it was determined
that two of the contacts had changed in the span of about a month. As a result, two
additional invitations were sent to the newly updated contacts identified during the
quality assurance check. The invitations encouraged the LEPC contacts to participate but
also to share within their committees at their discretion. If this sharing happened
consistently across all the groups and if a conservative estimate of 15 members per LEPC
was used, then 43 committees multiplied by 15 members could have exposed the survey
to well over 600 people. With the relatively small response rate and almost equal
representation from both rural and urban LEPCs, I posited that the invitations were not
further distributed or were distributed on an extremely limited basis. Regarding validation
of these invitations being sent and received, only one was returned as not available with
an out of office that stated the contact would not be available until October or for 4
additional months. Another one was returned due to a typo in the e-mail address, and this
was verified, updated, and resent within hours of the original invitation. The final
participant submitted data to the survey on July 1, 2021, that closed out the 2-week data
collection period.
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The duration for data collection in Chapter 3 used an example of 2 weeks, and
during the oral defense, the proposed method was to open it up for a week and then
consider if an additional week would benefit the study and do this based on the level of
feedback as it was possible that a high number of respondents could have participated.
Given potential competing factors, possibly lack of interest, or other unknown factors, the
survey slowly collected participants directly linked to the initial invite, the follow up, and
then the final reminder, and after 11-days, the online survey was closed due to inactivity.
After receiving feedback from one respondent regarding the survey, it was opened up to
allow additional responses, but after only one additional response, the survey was closed
and taken offline on July 1st with its 11th participant. At this point, the participation
numbers had reached its maximum and further reminder or requests would not have
drawn additional participation and might be perceived negatively for repeated follow ups.
Due to competing factors previously discussed that may have competed for attention with
the LEPCs, the LEPCs had been adequately queried and given ample time to respond or
indicate if they needed special provisions.
As noted in Chapter 3, the data were collected using a commercial survey tool
called SurveyMonkey, allowing participants to retain anonymity. This database is well
known and was likely familiar to many in the target audience; this was used intentionally
to allay any cybersecurity concerns anyone might have had with the e-mail invite, with a
hyperlink embedded to encourage potential respondents’ participation. To allow for
modification of the survey and appropriate level of use for this study, I upgraded to a paid
plan called the advantage plan that allowed for more tools to design the survey and make
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it as easy and simple to use as possible for the participants. This purchased plan allowed
for data collection and exporting to documents to various formats that could be saved and
stored securely, as required by the IRB for archive requirements of academic research.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was done manually using a simple qualitative data worksheet as the
most effective tool to link the data to the research questions. The data submitted to the
online database for this study was from 11 respondents, and the responses were mostly
short, direct statements that sometimes left me to interpret the meaning or implications.
Given the type of data provided and the relatively small number of respondents, I chose
to use a modified version of the qualitative data analysis worksheet provided by Walden
University. A separate worksheet was used for each relative question where the 11
respondents were listed in the column to the left for a particular question by participant
number only and then a bullet(s) was added for their response to that question in the next
column labeled data. Once that was entered for all appropriate respondents, the bulleted
items were then grouped into coded categories in the next column in groups, such as
training, planning support, and security assessments. The final column was used to
identify the theme of what the coded categories was presenting. This process was
iterative and edited numerous times to make sure themes were not lost, over emphasized,
and appropriately reported based upon the data provided.
Actual coding methodologies used in this study included first cycle structural
coding followed by second cycle pattern coding (Saldaña, 2013). The first round or cycle
was to pull out the major bullets, comments, or words related to the question asked while
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the pattern coding after that was used to categorize and group the responses. As part of
the first cycle coding, any words, or references to a specific county or LEPC were
removed to maintain the anonymity of the survey. Second cycle coding helped identify
themes and patterns that emerged as a result that were previously not as apparent or
seemingly present. Other coding methodologies were considered (e.g., attribute,
descriptive, in vivo, eclectic), but the structural and pattern coding worked most
effectively given the data type and content. The process was repeated multiple times to
look for theme and pattern changes, and then the original data were reviewed to make
sure there was a clear and repeatable flow from raw data through the coding process to
obtain the same or similar themes reported in this research and that no discrepant
responses were excluded or inappropriately marginalized.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
The data collection method used in this study was chosen to increase
trustworthiness and validity of the data. The invitations to participate were sent out to
LEPC contacts publicly available on the State of Washington’s website for LEPC data,
sharing of the invite to LEPC members was solely at the discretion of the single contact
listed for each group, and participation was completely anonymous using an online
survey. Additionally, to record the data, a commercially available professional survey
tool was used to compile the responses, store the data initially, and export the data in
various formats to help with analysis and archive requirements. After the initial
invitations were sent out, the contact names and email addresses used for the invite were
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compared with the state website, and I discovered two contacts had recently changed.
Invites to the two new contacts were sent out the same day as the other members.
The entire methodology aligned with what I previously described in Chapter 3
with only the slightest of modification. The survey was initially opened for 11-days
instead of the full 2-weeks, and this was largely due to the low response involvement that
I did not feel additional time would garner additional participation. Shortly after closing
the database, an additional LEPC chair reached out and asked to participate stating that
they had received the invite, wanted to participate, but that their computer server room
was flooded so the online survey was opened back up for the full 2-weeks but only
garnered the one additional participant. The other minor adjustment was the additional
reminder solicitations that were sent out to promote greater participation. The first
reminder was sent out 2-days after the initial invitation and the second follow up was sent
the following week. No other methodology changes were noted regarding variations to
what was previously articulated in Chapter 3.
Results
In this section, the results are presented in four broad categories that represent the
aggregated and coded data. The data could fit under either research question of what
could improve the CFATS efficacy as a program but also what organizational changes
might contribute to its effectiveness. The discussion on how the data contribute to each
research question will be discussed in detail within Chapter 5. This section will provide
the data along with any context or expansion on the topic that might further its
contribution or understanding.
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The below section provides data provided categorized by the question asked in the
survey.
1. Level of familiarity and understanding of the CFATS program, as defined by
Title 6 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 27:
2. Do you believe your LEPC is the appropriate organizational level to work
with the CFATS program? The LEPC is the appropriate forum for the CFATS
program to engage as it collects chemical data from communities already, is
an established public-private sector group for threat-info sharing, provides a
networking forum for people in these professions, and allows for adaptability
amongst those relationships to fill gaps such as how one county noted that
they do not have local fire response for dangerous chemical responses but
rather rely of federal support from the military.
3. What is the most important contribution the CFATS program could provide
your LEPC? Direct assistance, writing security plans, helping with industry
outreach and engagement, providing security recommendations, and training
for the LEPC membership about the CFATS program.
4. If you could change one thing about the CFATS program, what would it be?
The most predominant change recommendation was for much greater LEPC
engagement, more routine sharing of threat information, make security
recommendations, and provide security related training for all chemical
facilities, not just CFATS regulated sites. In this same context, there was also
a clear recommendation to have more CFATS inspectors.
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5. From a whole of government approach, what could the CFATS program do
better to make the chemicals more security in your community? While one
respondent recommended the CFATS program be defunded since they
thought it added nothing additional to what they already received from EPA’s
Risk Management Plan program, the majority noted needs such as providing
security assessments, grants for equipment, security training, and support
writing their security plans.
6. Have you worked with anyone from the CFATS program previously and was
that a positive experience? Most (6) had met someone from the CFATS
program and had a presentation and other support with a positive experience.
One possibly met TSA Rail Inspectors more than 7 years ago, two had never
met anyone from the CFATS program and two did not respond.
7. If your community was attacked by terrorists resulting in a chemical release,
what enhanced support could the CFATS program provide? The respondents
wanted CFATS support primarily in preparedness planning for such an attack
but also a couple incident management support roles emerged. The support
roles identified a need for an inspector assigned to the impacted LEPC to help
liaise and communicate with the chemical industry (e.g., impacted facilities
and others in range), help integrating into a federal response such as knowing
what assets and resources might be available, and also support in such a case
with public messaging to use their expertise in homeland security, chemical
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security, and federal operations to help the LEPC get the right message out to
their communities.
8. What phase of emergency management do you feel the CFATS program
contributes most to and should that be changed? Of the options of prevention,
protection, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, the respondents
chose prevention, protection, and mitigation. The prevention role was
emphasized as a positive contrasting it against other regulatory programs
seemingly more focused on issuing fines and stopping work whereas CFATS
reportedly focused more on increasing security and supporting industry.
9. Any additional concerns about the CFATS program or potential
improvements? What came out of this question for actionable items was to
work through the SERCs, be more visible in everyday actions, more
effectively communicate the key differences between CFATS and other
programs with potentially overlapping roles (e.g., OSHA, EPA), and
consolidation of those regulatory / security roles where and if applicable.
Deletion of CFATS
For fairness of reporting, there was one participant in the study who did not think
the CFATS program added value in addition to what the EPA and OSHA already
provided. Some of this person’s responses did not show up or stand out in the overall data
themes, for the most part, because in many cases they did not provide recommendations
beyond stating the program should be deleted. While it is always good to have dissenting
opinions to broaden the discussion, it is also good to have additional characterization to
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help potentially explain the perspective on the person’s contributions to further the
understanding of their input. As such, this section specifically calls out that single
respondents input to make sure it is given adequate attention since it might seem that it
did not show up adequately in the previous themes representing the key questions in the
survey.
There was a single respondent who recommended complete sunset of the CFATS
program but diving deeper into this person’s demographics and other response contribute
to a better understanding of the single perspective. This response was only seen from a
single respondent, Respondent #5, who self-identified as a member of industry from a
rural LEPC but with expertise level knowledge of the CFATS program. From this
respondent, their view was that the CFATS program was redundant, from an LEPC
perspective, as the LEPC already receives its chemical data from the EPA requirements.
According to Respondent #5, the list of chemicals in a community “mimics the public list
of facilities and chemicals” and the CFATS program with its “ridiculous confidentiality
requirement…completely contradicts the purpose of the LEPC.” When responding to the
question about what stage of emergency management did the CFATS program contribute
to, the respondent stated that they, “have not witnessed any evidence of CFATS” and that
they were, “not aware of CFATS ever preventing a terrorist event” and finally, that the
OSHA and EPA regulations on chemical facilities addressed all site security issues. Some
of these comments might result from the actual or perceived redundancy with other
regulatory programs.
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Removal of Any Redundancies with EPA and OSHA
Respondent #5 brought up a key issue that no other respondent mentioned, and
that was the issue of purported redundancy and overlap with other federal regulatory
programs. In this specific instance, the respondent only noted programs under EPA and
OSHA stating the CFATS programs were duplicative and therefore should be deleted as
they provided no additional value to the LEPC. The respondent stated that OSHA’s
Process Safety Management protocols and EPA’s Risk Management Program provided
all the security tools that were needed as part of OSHA’s Process Hazard Analysis. Along
the same theme, Respondent #11 mentioned a need for a federal framework for all
agencies with chemical security roles to clarify roles and responsibilities as well as
requirements to help LEPCs better understand who has what role. The potential overlap
with other agencies is important to understand at the LEPC level to know how to get
resources, grants, and support and this point was made clear in the data obtained in this
study.
Greater LEPC Involvement
By far, the most common response for what changes the LEPCs wanted from the
CFATS program was for greater participation with the LEPCs. Data supported this
participation because it was the most appropriate group dealing with chemicals in a
public-private partnership for interfacing, the LEPCs were considered the original node
for chemical reporting under various agencies, it allows for partnership building and
modifications based on need, and it is great for networking. What the respondents wanted
to see out of the CFATS engagement with LEPCs was broken down into four
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subcategories discussed below. These categories included more coordination with the
state coordinator for the LEPCs, more security related training, support during a crisis to
communicate with the chemical industry, identify response resources available, support
recovery from the incident, and assist in public messaging during an incident.
Working Through the State Coordinator
The LEPC program has a coordinator or coordinating office at the state level
called the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) that provides oversight,
funding, and coordination to the LEPCs within that particular state (Washington State,
2017). Respondent #1 from a rural LEPC in Washington, with a general understanding of
the CFATS program, and an emergency management background suggested that their
one change to the program would be greater LEPC and SERC level participation. While
others also noted greater LEPC participation from the CFATS program, this was the only
respondent to note the important of engagement with the SERC office as well. For the
open-ended question on any additional suggestions for CFATS program improvement,
the Respondent suggested having “CFATS work in concert with SERCs…[for] access to
LEPCs”.
Security Training and Grant Funding
When asked what the greatest contribution the CFATS program could provide
their LEPC, a common theme that broke out was training and grants to support
equipment for that training. Respondent #2 specifically noted a desire for “mandatory
training and funding to support the training” while Respondent #3 noted “training and
less secret squirrel mentality”, stating that the CFATS program should not only teach the
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facilities it regulates but also the LEPCs. The same respondent when asked what the one
thing was from a whole of government perspective that could help make chemicals safer
in their community with examples like grants, security assessments, and equipment, and
the Respondent #3 stated only one item, and that was for more training. What topics the
LEPCs wanted in this training included topics such as security assessments, according to
Respondent #6, site security training, per Respondent #10, and consolidated state and
federal requirements for security and response to hazardous chemical incidents, per
Respondent #11.
Liaison Role
The liaison role from the CFATS program was a clear theme that emerged from
the question of what contribution could the CFATS program provide your LEPC. From
that question, the data showed a desire for CFATS support in developing security plans
within the LEPC, sharing of threat information, access to after action reports, help with
preparedness planning, CFATS support with outreach to local industry, CFATS support
in providing security recommendations to more effectively protect chemicals in the
community and not just those that are CFATS regulated, and for the program to provide a
better understanding of what it is and what it can offer.
Public Information Role
Dovetailing off the liaison role, the public information role came out as a theme in
response to the question asking what post incident support would the LEPCs like to see
from the CFATS program. Some of the points made on this response theme included the
need-to-know what facilities in that LEPC jurisdiction were CFATS regulated, per
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Respondent #3, a desire for assistance the chemical facilities and public information
dissemination, per Respondent #4, and help understanding how a federal response would
integrate into what the LEPC was doing, per Respondent #1.
More Inspectors
The last major theme that came from the data was a recommendation for more
inspectors from the CFATS program, noted by both Respondents #2 and #10, although
Respondent #5 did recommend eliminating the program altogether. Other respondents
commented with questions as to what additional help they could get from the CFATS
program. Respondent #7 commented about specific security training for both regulated
and non-CFATS regulated chemical facilities while Respondent #4 wanted more security
assessments, and Respondent #6 noted help with drafting plans.
Summary
The research questions that guided this research asked what changes could
improve the CFATS program in the State of Washington and then also what
organizational changes would also improve the program. While a single respondent from
the chemical industry recommended ending the CFATS program as a redundant program
to what the EPA and OSHA already provided, the remainder of the respondents
supported enhancements and even expanded roles that might require expanded authority.
The enhancements included clarification of where the CFATS program functioned that
was different from the EPA and OSHA to more participation in the LEPCs themselves.
This LEPC expanded role includes coordination through the SERC, providing various
types of security training that apply to CFATS regulated and non-regulated sites,
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supporting or assisting with engagement with industry, and public information assistance
to not only help with communicating with industry but with public messaging during a
chemical incident. A theme that emerged in this context was more support during a
chemical incident to help the LEPC understand its integration into the federal response
system, help identify available federal resources, and even support recovery. Lastly, all
this additional support did also recognize a need for more CFATS inspectors to work
more proactively with all LEPCs regardless of whether they had CFATS regulated sites
in their jurisdictions or not. My research revealed that most LEPCs wanted more
inspector involvement to help with preparedness planning, industry engagement, and
security related training for the LEPCs themselves.
These findings are further discussed in Chapter 5 and compared against what the
literature review discovered in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 discusses the findings, interprets the
themes, and discusses the findings from the theoretical framework of contingency theory
and organizational theory. The following section provides the implications for this study
in the context of positive social change and provides recommendations based on the
findings.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of conducting this research was to evaluate the efficacy of the
CFATS program in Washington from the perspective of the LEPCs in Washington. This
was done because of the importance of protecting communities from a chemical terror
attack and to fill an existing gap in literature on this topic that had not previously looked
at the efficacy of the CFATS program at the state level and from the LEPC perspective to
ask what worked, what did not work, what could change, and how the program could be
made better. The study contributes to the body of knowledge by using a qualitative
approach using Bamberger and Mabry’s (2020) evaluative approach for methodology. To
frame the study in theoretical concepts, I used the contingency theory of organization
(Donaldson, 2001) and the theory of organizational culture (Shafritz et al., 2005). This
increased understanding helped fill the gap in the literature.
Several change recommendations that came out of this study added to the existing
literature in that Washington LEPCs wanted more inspectors, more participation, grant
funding for equipment and training, more support in their planning efforts, more threatrelated information sharing, greater use of the SERC position, liaison support and public
messaging support during crises, and clarification of roles from the various federal
programs that have regulatory chemical security programs. This contrasted from what
was identified in Chapter 2 where the literature identified other priorities such as a longterm reauthorization of the program, specific changes to Appendix A that identifies
which chemicals are regulated, greater transparency in how facilities are tiered, and
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concerns with emerging threats such as increased sightings of drones in or around
chemical facilities. One of the areas that the literature and LEPCs in Washington did
seem to show common ground was on the topic of differentiation from the other chemical
security programs. The study’s findings are highlighted in Table 2 and are discussed in
greater detail under the headings of interpretation of findings, study limitations,
recommendations, implications, and the study’s conclusion.
Washington LEPC Changes to CFATS Program
There were eight key recommendations that came directly from the respondents
that participated in this study regarding how to get more out of the LEPC engagement
with the CFATS program. These recommendations included:
•

more chemical security inspectors

•

removal of overlap with other agencies

•

greater LEPC participation

•

greater use of the SERC

•

security training to LEPC

•

grant funding for equipment and training

•

liaison support to engage industry

•

public information support during crises

71
Interpretation of Findings
Theoretical Framework
Contingency Theory of Organization
Every study has a theoretical framework that guides the interpretation and
analysis of the data, and this study implemented two theories to help guide its analysis.
The first of those frameworks was the contingency theory of organization (Donaldson,
2001). It was this theory that seemed to fit the LEPC and emergency management culture
most appropriately because they must adapt to constantly changing environments whether
that is changes in participation, funding, size, or just changes from normal day-to-day
routines to a much faster paced crisis such as a large chemical explosion in their
community.
Donaldson (2001) defined contingency theory as not the theory that seeks out the
maximum performance of the organization but rather a theory that seeks out the most
appropriate performance attributes under the specific circumstances based on the current
“environment, organizational size, and strategy” (p. 2). He noted two organizational
styles in this context of mechanistic and organic. The style most appropriate to the
normal day-to-day operations might be mechanistic or structural to facilitate information
flow, assignment of tasks, and an expected flow of communications such as from the
mayor’s office down to the emergency manager and LEPC. In contrast, the organic
structure refers to a more horizontal and participatory approach that essentially throws
out the titles, structure, and rigidity of the mechanistic organizational structure and fosters
creativity to allow those at much lower levels the empowerment to get the job done. The
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organic structure is much more likely to foster a successful environment during a crisis
that would involve both the CFATS program and the LEPCs. While organization
structures largely define how a LEPC and the CFATS program might formally interact,
another less visible factor had to be considered and that was whether the actual types of
people involved either promoted or detracted from a productive engagement.
Organizational Culture Theory
The second key theory to frame the lens on how the data were viewed in this
study was that of organizational culture theory (see Shafritz et al., 2005). This refers to
the “many intangible phenomena, such as values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions,
behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior” in an organization, or in this case,
an LEPC (Shafritz et al., 2005, p. 352). It is in this context that some of the responses
might best be framed such as whether the respondent identified as an emergency
manager, someone from the chemical industry, or any other category. This might also be
used to explain potential impediments to how organizations and agencies coordinate,
collaborate, or do not perform these functions as well as other groups under similar
situations.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the CFATS program in Washington
from the LEPC perspective and contribute to a gap in the literature. In this study, I
conducted research that invited all the LEPCs in Washington to provide comments on the
CFATS program and the LEPC-CFATS relationship to help fill that gap in knowledge as
it relates specific to Washington. There was no expectation at the time of any particular
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outcome such as whether it would align with what was identified in the literature review
or whether it would be contradictory.
The LEPC chairs received the invites and were encouraged to share, at their
discretion, within their LEPC membership, so the number of participants in the study
could have been quite large as these committees can have dozens of members from a
broad range of backgrounds and expertise. Some of these backgrounds or specialties, for
example, include expertise in emergency management, first responders, academia,
industry, lobbyists, and various government organizations at the local, state, tribal, and
federal level based upon individual LEPC membership. From the data provided, however,
it appeared the invites were not shared within the individual committees, or to an
extremely limited amount given the total number of respondents was 11 and those were
mostly from the same professional background of emergency managers.
In the Chapter 2 literature review, there were 10 commonly identified change
recommendations found in existing literature for the CFATS program. These change
recommendations were compared to the results collected in this study, shown in Chapter
5, Table 2. From that comparison, it is apparent that there were two commonalities from
what the literature review identified and what the responding LEPCs in Washington
provided. This area of overlap was primarily in the desire for more engagement by the
CFATS program to the LEPCs while both also noted the potential overlap between
similar regulatory programs such as CFATS with one of the EPA programs.
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Table 2
Comparison of Literature Review and WA LEPC Findings
Chapter 2 findings

WA LEPC findings

1. Better information sharing to LEPCs

1. More inspectors

2. Synergy with other regulatory

2. Removal of overlap with EPA /

programs

OSHA

3. Inspector training

3. Greater involvement in LEPCs

4. Long-term reauthorization

4. Greater use of SERC role

5. Emerging threats (e.g., drones

5. Security training to LEPC members

6. Inherently safer technologies

6. Liaison role to help with industry

7. Appendix A changes
8. Land use planning
9. Tiering process transparency
10. Better documentation of compliance
activities

communications during crises
7. Liaison role to help public
messaging role during crises
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The LEPC participation with the CFATS program was the most common theme in
this research. The literature review loosely referenced LEPC coordination without
specifically mentioning the LEPC. Shea (2010) discussed options that the U.S. Congress
might make to modify the CFATS program, such as making some of the program’s
information more available (e.g., enforcement activities), stating that this could help with
engagement with some stakeholder groups. A much more current government report of
the CFATS program and its collaboration (Anderson, 2021) reviewed the CFATS
program that noted numerous areas in its program where it requires regulated facilities to
coordinate, plan, notify, or work with local law enforcement and first responders and the
body most commonly available for this task in Washington would be the LEPC.
The data obtained from the Washington LEPCs was more specific about their
needs and wants from the CFATS program. The data showed that LEPCs wanted the
CFATS program to provide training to the entire LEPC on what the CFATS program is
about, what it can offer, who to contact with the CFATS program, and other more
involved services. Additional support identified in this study included help from the
CFATS program with industry outreach, helping to resolve security issues, support
developing security plans, and identifying the high-risk CFATS facilities within that
LEPC’s area.
One of the additional items that came out of this study was that some LEPCs
wanted broader support (e.g., training, advising, plan writing) from the CFATS program.
In the past, the CFATS program would likely only provide training to a LEPC on its
regulatory program that impacted only the few CFATS regulated chemical facilities,
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whereas the LEPC might deal with dozens or even hundreds more chemical facilities that
were regulated by the same EPA laws that created the LEPCs themselves. From the data
obtained, LEPCs expressed a desire in having CFATS training they could use that might
help with all their sites and not just the few that were specifically regulated under the
CFATS program. To fulfill this expanded role, the CFATS program would likely be
advising and sharing security best practices, security information, security training
knowledge, and more that could likely augment and compliment what is required under
EPA and OSHA regulations but from an advisor and information sharing perspective
based on the CFATS’ emphasis of security and antiterrorism. Whether or not these
recommendations are feasible is further evaluated in the next section.
Evaluative Approach
Using Bamberger and Mabry’s (2020) method, the data can be discussed in the
context of realistic limitations that were very applicable to this study. In this model, there
are seven steps, and for the purposes of this analysis, the final step that involved returning
to the client to guide them in implementation was omitted as that would fall under
recommendations for future research and was not part of this study. In this analysis, I
used Bamberger and Mabry’s model of evaluation for planning and scoping the situation
as Step 1, and then go into budget constraints, time constraints, data constraints, political
and organizational constraints on both the CFATS program in Washington to meet the
needs identified in this study, and then end with my conclusions.
Planning and Scoping

77
The planning and scoping of this analysis was this study on the LEPCs in
Washington with the intent to improve both the capability of individual LEPCs but also
to improve the CFATS program and how it is implemented specific to a single state.
While the goal is to improve upon the CFATS program at the regional level, the planning
and scoping in this context was to identify the area of the study (i.e., Washington), the
program of focus (i.e., CFATS), and the needs and perspectives of as many of the LEPCs
that would participate to see what the CFATS program is doing, if it is adding value,
what could be changed, and potentially if it should direct its efforts elsewhere.
Budget Constraints
It was outside the scope of this study to attempt to address budget constraints of
the many different LEPCs across the State of Washington, so I focused on budget
constraints against the CFATS program in Washington regarding whether or to what
extent its budget would limit its ability to provide the desired services identified in this
study.
Some of the recommendations brought up by the LEPCs could be instituted with
little or no impact to budget constraints while others likely need to be further defined to
assess any true impact. Removing the overlap with EPA and OSHA is currently in
progress, and the CFATS program meets routinely with them to discuss cases and align
efforts. While the federal agencies do this, there needs to be a better effort to make that
more transparent to LEPCs, thus the next recommendation of making greater use of the
SERC program that oversees the LEPC program. The state coordinator could likely help
articulate federal issues and concerns and could raise issues for the federal agencies to
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address or speak to in specific meetings. Bringing such clarification to these meetings
either in person, virtually, or asynchronously directly from the agency, office, and person
involved would likely prove productive and allow for feedback to the information source.
This engagement alone could help address the request to be more engaging with the
LEPCs, but the remaining items of more inspectors and incident support roles could be
problematic regarding budget constraints because pending how they are used, the number
of days used, and other factors, this would like involve federal travel funds, and, while
possible, it would certainly have budget constraints that would be a very clear limiting
factor as to how often and how long such onsite support could be provided.
Time Constraints
The time limitations for this category are from a programmatic perspective of the
CFATS program in Washington as to whether they could meet the needs and wants of the
LEPC. The overlap and coordination with OSHA, EPA, and other agencies remains in
place, but making that more transparent to the LEPCs could benefit from increased
coordination with the SERC to bring up issues or provide feedback and that arguably
would not be a significant burden on time. Inspectors in the CFATS program in
Washington already attend numerous LEPC meetings, so getting more involved,
engaging more, and providing additional assistance could be prioritized and the
recommendation to involve the SERC more would likely add to this effort. The SERC
office could help focus limited resources, such as the Chemical Security Inspectors, to
specific LEPCs that needed, wanted, or could benefit most from the support in the best
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interest of the CFATS program and the LEPC while reducing repeat visits to other
LEPCs that didn’t need, want, or value the additional engagement.
The liaison support role of communicating to the chemical industry during an
incident or time of increased threat continues to progress through formal notifications
directly to the regulated facilities through the CFATS chemical security portal, and the
CFATS program is starting a program to engage the many more sites that fall under the
program but are not actually regulated; this would help meet the communication wants
from the LEPCs, but communicating how that is working and updates certainly needs to
be added to the outreach and engagement strategy.
Data Constraints
In the context of what data is needed by the LEPCs based on this study, it was
apparent that likely the most basic need was a better understanding of what the CFATS
program is and what it could provide to the LEPCs during both stabile and unstable
environments. Data resource constraints might include how the LEPC gets information as
there were requests identified in this study where LEPCs wanted more routine threatlevel information and support communicating with the chemical industry. If the threat
level information was sent out through any of the federal databases that require vetting
and layers of approval, this may be a constraint for a LEPC. Additionally, if the
communications to the chemical industry were done via a secure web-based application
such as what is used for the chemical industry to report their Top Screens under the
CFATS regulatory requirements, it is not likely the LEPC would have access or even
visibility of what the CFATS program was communicating to chemical facilities in their

80
community. There are certainly several federal databases that could help share threat
related information to the LEPC membership and this is something that should be further
explored through the SERC and subsequent LEPC engagement by the CFATS program in
Washington.
Political and Organizational Constraints
For a LEPC to work directly with federal counterparts, sometimes it is as easy as
calling the federal member who routinely participates in meetings or maybe that person
who shows up periodically and resolve issues but other times it can involve going
through numerous layers of bureaucracy at the local level and then to the various state
representative that oversee the LEPC programs. From there, it could be that one federal
agency has part of the information needed but must coordinate with other federal
agencies or even back to a state agency not previously involved. This point came out in
the study where Respondent #5 commented that the entire CFATS program should be
defunded because the person saw no additional value added on top of the chemical data
already received based on EPA requirements. It is possible that due to the layers of
bureaucracy that the participant never saw past the single agency requirements or
understood how many unique requirements numerous federal agencies have over
different chemicals.
It is likely for various reasons that this person did not know enough about the
CFATS program and how its list of chemicals it regulates in Appendix A (see Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 2020) is different from what the EPA regulates and
for very different reasons. For example, a chemical called Methylphosphonothioic
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dichloride is regulated under CFATS as a chemical weapon precursor security issue at
just over 2 pounds and at a minimum of 30% concentration but this doesn’t fall under
EPA regulations so the LEPC would not likely be aware of such holdings, or other
similar chemicals in their community. Getting such information requires the ability to
freely cross political and organizational boundaries going from one trusted agency to
another and maybe numerous other positions between them.
It is understandable that a LEPC member might think in such a myopic way with
so many challenges potentially working against them to reach out to new agencies and
offices and to be kept abreast of important information as the chemical preparedness
profession continues to evolve not just within the chemical industry or bureaucracy that
envelops it, but also with in the local governance organizations themselves. This
reinforces the data obtained emphasizing training to these groups where these federal
agencies need to do a better job with transparency and sharing what their programs are
about and how they mesh with other similar or complimentary oversight programs at all
levels of government. This is a significant concern as a LEPC with its volunteer members
might have to go through numerous state and federal agencies to seek out information,
training, support, and so on and this is certainly a constraint. Additionally, membership
would also have to deal with pressures from their own employer, community members,
special interest groups, private citizens, and elected officials just to name a few.
Conclusions
Where does all this leave us in our understanding using the adapted version of
Bamberger and Mabry (2020) evaluative methodology? Its intent was to portray the
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CFATS to LEPC relationship in Washington under a much more realistic framework in
the context of the many pressures both programs face to help empathize and better
understand opportunities to improve the relationship. The CFATS program in
Washington has a very small number of inspectors and staff, this study and evaluation
helped to clearly identify pathways forward that could enhance the LEPC-CFATS
program engagement that would benefit both entities positively while operating within
the constraints of budget, time, data, and political pressures. The study’s limitations are
addressed in the next section.
Limitations of the Study
In the proposal for this research, specifically in Chapter 1, there were two specific
limitations to this study identified that included getting the broadest representation from
LEPCs across the state and then getting appropriate participation to garner productive
participation in the study. The first limitation of the study was the geographic diversity of
the respondents meaning would they come from different portions of the state and not be
overly represented by just the urban areas, for example. From the data collected, the
respondents that answered whether they belonged to an urban or rural LEPC, the split
was about half and half with four from rural LEPCs and 5 from urban areas. While it is
not possible to tell if all corners of the state were represented, the primary goal listed in
the proposal was to seek participation from both large and small LEPCs representing the
cities and rural communities and the data shows that this was achieved and therefore
should not have been a significant limitation to the geographic diversity of the
participation.
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The second potential limitation from the proposal was the potential to have a low
response rate primarily because the topic was on anti-terrorism related policies and that
might have influenced responses. While there is no way in an anonymous online survey
to ascertain if this was the reason more people did not respond, Chapter 4 also noted
additional competing factors that could have garnered the attention of LEPCs during the
time of this study with things such as record setting temperatures, chlorine shortages,
opening the state after more than a year of COVID-19 related lock down, or other
unknown factors. While the data obtained certainly helps further the discussion and
contribution to the body of knowledge, these limitations should be considered as it is
possible or even likely that one, a combination, or even other factors contributed to the
moderate to low response rate or participation in the study.
Recommendations
The LEPCs provided useful information that contributed to this study and
furthered the body of knowledge on the CFATS program and its efficacy in Washington.
The CFATS program in Washington should look into how it can more effectively and
routinely engage the SERC program for coordination and transparency, it should use that
engagement to develop a more effective engagement strategy with the LEPCs, it should
look at how to share information on threats more effectively, it should help the LEPCs
engage a broader group of chemical facilities (not just CFATS regulated), it should look
at providing physical security training and also explore ways to help LEPCs in an
incident with communications and messaging. The two bigger picture items that should
be pursued, based on this study, should be to explore CFATs or chemical security related
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federal grant funding mechanisms or sources and the potentiality of adding more
inspectors to help make LEPC engagement more frequent and participative than it
currently is with only periodic attendance.
Implications
The greatest implications for this study could be significant policy changes to the
Region 10 CFATS program focusing on LEPCs in Washington. The vast majority of
recommendations are already in progress to varying degrees, but their efficacy could be
improved and certainly the transparency of those changes or initiatives could be shared
more effectively. This study could lead to a much more vibrant and useful engagement of
LEPCs in Washington where they are provided needed tools, training, and eventually
maybe even funding to get training, resources, and perform their mission more
effectively. Given that the CFATS program is an anti-terrorism program, making many of
these fine-tuning adjustments would be good for the CFATS program in Washington and
the LEPCs that want more effective engagement but the bigger goal in such effort,
programmatic, and policy changes that make all the effort worthwhile is that citizen are
better protected, and communities are safer.
Conclusion
The chapter provided an overview of the change recommendations obtained from
Chapter 4 and expanded on them and provided context. It also took that data and
stretched it to identify areas for future research that could build upon this study. It was
clear that LEPCs wanted the CFATS program to provide specific skills with training,
recommendations, and sharing of threat-information, but also expansion of the program.
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The expansion included increases to number of inspectors to better support the LEPCs
with training, planning, and incident management related support, but also stated the
program would add more value with its own grant program that could bolster its ability to
help improve security, training, and exercises related to chemical security such as
physical security items and exercises. This expanded what was previously discovered in
Chapter 2 that focused more on the CFATS program and items such as its long-term
reauthorization, specific changes to the chemicals it regulated in Appendix A, and better
transparency in how it tiered the facilities that submitted data that ranks them amongst
four subcategories of high-risk. There was one commonality between what was found in
the literature review and this study, and that was the desire for better information sharing
to the LEPCs and while Chapter 2 input was somewhat vague, this study on the LEPCs in
Washington added much greater specificity. The overall study helped to fill the gap in
literature and highlighted key modifications that could be made between the CFATSLEPC programmatic relationships today and identified broader changes that it could
strive for to increase its efficacy that would improve it as a program, help LEPCs in the
local communities across Washington, and most importantly help keep these
communities possibly just a bit safer. While this study focused solely on the CFATS
program in Washington, some of these takeaways might also inform the committee that
takes up the next version of the program when it is reviewed by policy makers for a
potential extension or reauthorization in 2023.
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